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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondenti 
-vs-
RICHARD WAYNE WARD, aka 
MORRIS GUTHRIE, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No, 
14276 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Richard Wayne Ward, was convicted 
in a criminal proceeding of aggravated robbery in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Richard Wayne Ward was tried and convicted by a 
jury of aggravated robbery. The appellant was sentenced 
for a term of imprisonment in the Utah State Prison as 
provided for by law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that the verdict of the 
trial court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 2, 1975, at approximately 11:00 a.m. 
an armed robbery was committed at the Thrifty Drug 
Store, 4153 South 1700 West, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The assailant was later identified by the drug store's 
cashier as the appellant (Tr.76). Appellant entered 
the drug store on that warm July morning wearing a 
jacket, heavy hunting hat, and gold rim sunglcisses. 
The drug store cashier, Sharon Petersen, took special 
notice of appellant's attire (Tr.70). Appellcmt approached 
the cashier's checkstand holding a multi-colored beach 
towel, as if he intended to purchase it. Appellant then 
produced a silver colored nickle plated revolver. 
Pointing the revolver at the cashier, he directed her 
to place the store's cash in one of the store's green 
colored money bags. The cashier placed approximately 
$120.00 in the bag (Tr. 72,74). As the appellant then 
exited the store, Mr. Roger Arnold, a store customer, 
observed appellant getting into a green automobile bearing 
Texas plates (Tr.100). Mr. Arnold wrote down the car's 
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license number, which was then broadcast over the police 
radio along with the general description of the automobile. 
Officer Don Schindler received the description and 
license number of the automobile and shortly thereafter 
discovered the car in Murray, parked on State Street in front 
of the Playmate Lounge (Tr.6). Officer Schindler along with 
another officer entered the Playmate Lounge looking for a 
black male suspect, having received an erroneous description 
of the suspect over the dispatch. The officers noticed three 
individuals sitting in a booth on the north side of the lounge 
and several others around the pinball machines, but saw no black 
individual (Tr.9). 
The officers went in and out of the lounge twice 
but again did not observe a black suspect. A later description 
correcting the original mistaken one was broadcast describing 
the suspect as a white male with dark bushy hair, long side-
burns, and a deep tan (Tr.13). With this revised description 
the officers entered the lounge looking for the suspect. The 
officers observed a man fitting the description sitting alone 
at the booth where there had once been two other men (Tr.15). 
The officers approached appellant requesting his name and 
identification. Appellant produced a Texas driver's license. 
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At this point officer Pederson informed appellant of his 
constitutional rights (Miranda warning) (Tr.26), and 
then proceeded to search appellant's person (Tr.26). 
According to Officer Gary Pederson, appellant produced -
a set of car keys (Tr.27). Then, according to Officer 
Schindler, appellant denied ownership of the keys and 
disclaimed ownership of the car (Tr.19). Officer 
Schindler also testified that appellant was asked if 
he would mind if the officers checked to see if the keys 
fit the vehicle and appellant that he would not mind 
(Tr.20). 
Officer Schindler then used the keys obtained 
from appellant to unlock the door to the green automobile 
(Tr.185). Shortly thereafter the automobile was searched 
without a warrant and a revolver, hunting cap, checkstand 
bag, sunglasses, jacket and multicolored towel were seized 
in the search. 
The seized items were later identified by 
State's witness Sharon Petersen as being those items 
either worn or carried by appellant at the time of the 
armed robbery (Tr.139-145). 
-4-
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The trial court refused to suppress the evidence 
removed from the green automobile bearing the Texas plates 
and it is on the issue of the legality of the search and 
seizure that appellant is appealing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT FOURTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN OBJECTION TO THE SEARCH OF THE GREEN 
AUTOMOBILE BEARING TEXAS PLATES. 
The issue of whether appellant has standing to 
contest the legality of the search of the automobile 
hinges on his claim of possessary or proprietary interest 
in the automobile. In State v. Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38f 
414 P.2d 958 (1966), this Court stated the rule for 
determining standing to challenge an unlawful search or 
seizure: 
"In order for appellant to 
have standing to raise the issue of 
an unlawful arrest, the sole pre-
requisite is that he claim a pro-
prietary or possessary interest in the 
searched or seized property." Ic[. at 
41. 
Appellant contends that he meets both of these 
requirements by coming before this Court and claiming a 
proprietary or possessary interest in the automobile. 
For appellant to have standing to make his Fourth 
- t ; _ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Amendment claim, it is required that he not disclaim 
ownership in the automobile at the time of the search. 
In the case of United States v. Williams, 538 F.2d 549 
(4th Cir. 1976) , the defendant, when questioned by 
federal agents, denied ownership of a briefcase and 
typewriter case found lying on the floor of his motel 
room. The cases were seized and searched by the federal 
agents. The FourthCircuit Court of Appeals held as 
follows: 
"The record, however, shows 
that defendant voluntarily 
admitted the agents into his motel 
room, disclaimed ownership of the 
brief case and the typewriter case 
and stated that he had no objection 
to a search of the cases. His 
disclaimer is analogous to abandon-
ment and made the cases subject to 
seizure." Id. at 550, 551. 
Thus, United States v. Williams, supra, clearly 
holds that in order for a defendant to have stemding to 
claim Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful search 
and seizure he must not disclaim ownership in the 
thing to be searched at the time the officer questions 
him as to his interest therein. 
The Court in Simpson v. United States, 34 6 F.2d 
291 (10th Cir. 1965), held that defendant in possession 
-6-
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of a stolen vehicle had standing to claim the car was 
unlawfully searched and seized because his lack of 
ownership was not established until after the search. 
The Simpson case is distinguishable from this case in 
that Simpson claimed a proprietary or possessary interest 
in the car prior to the search, whereas appellant in the 
instant case disclaimed such interest. 
In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), 
the Supreme Court held that Jones, convicted of possession 
of narcotics, was not required to claim ownership of the 
narcotics in order to have standing to question the validity 
of the search and seizure. To require a claim of ownership 
would have forced Jones to allege facts sufficient to convict 
him. However, this is not true in the case before the 
Court. A claim of a proprietary or possessary interest in 
the car on the part of appellant would not have been 
sufficient to convict him of armed robbery. 
Appellant therefore, in order to have standing 
to raise an objection to the alleged unlawful search,had 
to claim ownership interest in the automobile prior to the 
search. Having failed to do this, appellant lacks 
standing to raise the objection at this time. 
-7-
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POINT II 
APPELLANT'S VALID CONSENT TO THE WARRANTLESS 
SEARCH OF THE AUTOMOBILE RENDERS THE SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE VALID. 
Warrantless searches as a general rule are 
invalid, unless they fall under one of the exceptions 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218 (1973), recognized a consent search as an 
exception to the requirements of a search warrcint and 
probable cause. 
Appellant in the present case when asked by 
police officers if he would mind their searching the 
automobile with Texas license plates, did not object 
to the warrantless search (Tr.188). 
Appellant, prior to his consenting to the 
search, had been given the Miranda warning (Tr. 
26). In Schoor v. State, Okl. Cr., 499 P.2d 450 
(1972), the Court of Criminal Appeals for Oklahoma 
recognized the validity of a consent to search 
where the consent followed an appropriate Miranda 
warning. The Court said: 
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" . . . if the proper Miranda 
and Escobedo warnings are given 
the defendant prior to interrogation 
and he thereafter, voluntarily and 
without coercion, gives permission or 
consent to search, the same is a 
constitutionally valid consent." 
Id., at 456. 
Appellant in the case before the court after 
receiving the Miranda warning voluntarily consented 
to the search of the automobile. 
Appellant contends that having denied 
ownership in the automobile, he thought he was 
deprived of the right to refuse his consent. Again 
in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, the Supreme 
Court held that knowledge of the right to refuse 
consent was not a prerequisite to the State proving 
a voluntary consent. Id. at 249. 
-9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant further agrees that his consent to the 
warrantless search was involuntary in that he had to choose 
between disclaiming any interest in the automobile and 
refusing the police permission to search the car. Appellant 
knew that his possessing a Texas drivers license and a 
set of keys, which fit the automobile bearing Texas plates, 
was sufficient to connect him with the automobile, regard-
less of whether appellant claimed an interest in the car. 
For appellant to argue that his fear of being connected with 
the automobile prevented him from claiming an interest in 
the automobile, which in turn prevented him from refusing 
his consent, does not make sense. The fact that appellant 
was so obviously connected with the vehicle would more 
likely have made appellant refuse his consent in order to 
prevent the discovery of the incriminating evidence. The 
facts of this do not support appellant's contention that 
the consent was involuntary. The Supreme Court again in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, stated that: 
"When the subject of a search is 
not in custody and the State attempts 
to justify a search on the basis of 
his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require that it demonstrate 
that the consent was in fact voluntarily 
given, and not the result of duress 
or coercion, express or implied. Vol-
untariness is a question of fact to 
be determined from all the circumstances." 
Id. at 875. 
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Appellant in the present case argues on the one 
hand his disclaimer of ownership of the automobile and his 
consenting to the search thereof, and then on the other 
hand claiming he has a possessory or proprietary interest 
in the car and claiming the consent to search was involuntarily 
given. In view of the obvious connection between appellant 
and the automobile, the facts of the case support the holding 
that appellant voluntarily consented to the search. 
POINT III 
THE SEARCH OF THE AUTOMOBILE WITHOUT WARRANT DID 
NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS, IN THAT 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED TO WARRANT THE SEARCH ON 
PROBABLE CAUSE. 
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution requires 
generally that a valid search warrant based on probable cause 
be issued by a magistrate, prior to a search and seizure. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized certain 
exceptions to this general rule. The automobile exception 
was first recognized in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132 (1924). The court held in that case that an automobile 
transporting contraband could be searched without a warrant 
when the search was based on probable cause. 
Since Carroll, supra, the warrantless search of an 
automobile has been held to be valid only when exigent 
circumstances exist. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 
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(1970), the Court explained what exigent circumstances 
are sufficient to render a warrantless automobile search 
valid. In Chambers, supra, defendant and three others 
were arrested on probable cause while driving in defendant's 
car on a public road. Defendant was taken into custody 
and the car was taken to the police station. The car 
was later searched at the station without a warrant. There 
was no chance the defendant in that case would take flight 
from the jurisdiction or remove the car from police custody. 
The police could easily have obtained a search warrant but 
instead conducted a warrantless search. In holding the 
search and seizure valid the Supreme Court stated: 
"For constitutional purposes, we 
see no difference between on the one 
hand seizing and holding a car before 
presenting the probable cause issue to 
a magistrate and on the other hand 
carrying out an immediate search with-
out a warrant. Given probable cause 
to search, either course is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment." ]Cd. at 42 8. 
Appellant argues that the required exigent cir-
cumstances to support a warrantless search are lacking in 
the case at bar. As authority appellant cites Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), where the Supreme Court 
held a warrantless automobile search invalid. The Coolidge, 
supra, case is easily distinguished from the present case. 
The automobile searched in Coolidge, supra, was not on 
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public property, it was taken from the defendant's private 
driveway. The defendant, Coolidge, was also a resident of 
the trial court's jurisdiction (not a transient). In both 
Chambers, supra, and the instant case, the automobiles 
were searched and seized on public streets. In the present 
case, the appellant and the searched automobile were from 
out of state. These distinguishing facts were recognized 
in United States v. Pollard, 466 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1972). 
In Pollard, supra, the court distinguished the exigent cir-
cumstances in Coolidge, supra from those in Chambers, supra. 
In Pollard, federal agents had probable cause to believe 
defendant had attempted to burglarize a bank. Defendant 
was in his motel room away from his car with the car locked 
in the motel parking lot. In upholding the warrantless 
search the court stated: 
" . . . Pollard was a transient, of 
sorts, hundreds of miles from his 
home, with his vehicle parked just 
outside his motel room and readily 
available for a quick departure. 
. . . Pollard's Buick was, in our 
view, a 'fleeting target1 of the 
type alluded to in Chambers and the 
instant case presents exigent cir-
cumstances not present in Coolidge. 
Accordingly, it is on this basis that 
we find the search of Pollard's 
Buick to be a lawful one." Id. at 5. 
13-
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The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Shields, 28 Utah 
2d 405, 503 P.2d 848 (1972), upheld a warrantless auto-
mobile search under circumstances similiar to those 
existing in Pollard, supra, and in the instant case. 
I n
 Shields the driver of the searched vehicle was arrested 
in a cafe with the car parked and locked on the street. 
The police drove the car to the police station and there 
conducted a warrantless search. The Utah Supreme Court 
relied on Chambers, supra, in finding that exigent cir-
cumstances existed to warrant the search on probable cause. 
Appellant in the present case was a trcmsient, 
driving an out of state vehicle. The automobile was 
parked on a public street. Other persons had been sitting 
in the Playmate Lounge with appellant and possibly had 
keys to the automobile. Clearly exigent circumstances 
existed to warrant the immediate search of the car. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant lacks standing to claim Fourth Amendment 
protection to the search and seizure, due to his failure 
to claim a possessary or proprietary interest in the auto-
mobile at the time of the search. 
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Assuming arguendo appellant has standing, the 
warrantless search conducted by the police was made with 
the consent of the appellant and was made upon probable 
cause under exigent circumstances sufficient to render 
the search valid. Therefore, appellant's request for 
reversal and remand should be denied. 
Respectfully sybmitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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